UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

3-8-2017

State v. Gibbs Respondent's Brief Dckt. 44299

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"State v. Gibbs Respondent's Brief Dckt. 44299" (2017). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All. 6473.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/6473

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For
more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
) No. 44299
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
) Kootenai County Case No.
v.
) CR-2013-5235
)
KODY RAY GIBBS,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
)
________________________
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
________________________
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
________________________
HONORABLE JOHN T. MITCHELL
District Judge
________________________
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
PAUL R. PANTHER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division

ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate
Public Defender
322 E. Front St., Ste. 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 334-2712

TED S. TOLLEFSON
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P. O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534
ATTORNEYS FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

ATTORNEY FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... iii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................... 1
Nature of the Case..................................................................................... 1
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings ........................................ 1
ISSUES ................................................................................................................ 7
ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................... 8
I.

The District Court Did Not Commit Fundamental Error
By Remaining On This Case And Extending Gibbs’
Probationary Period ........................................................................ 8
A.

Introduction .......................................................................... 8

B.

Standard Of Review ............................................................. 8

C.

Gibbs Has Failed To Show The District Court
Was Not Impartial................................................................. 9
1.

Gibbs Has Failed To Establish The
District Court Was Not Impartial And
That The District Court Violated An
Unwaived Constitutional Right By
Presiding Over His Case ........................................... 9

2.

Gibbs Has Failed To Establish It Was
Clear Error For The District Court To
Preside Over Gibbs’ Case ....................................... 15

3.

Gibbs Has Failed To Show The First
Two Prongs Of The Fundamental Error
Test; Thus The Harmlessness Prong Is
Moot......................................................................... 16

i

II.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion ............................ 16
A.

Introduction ........................................................................ 16

B.

Standard Of Review ........................................................... 16

C.

Gibbs Has Failed To Show The District Court
Abused Its Discretion When It Extended His
Probation ............................................................................ 17
1.

The District Court Rightly Perceived
The Issue Of Whether To Extend
Gibbs’ Probation As One Of Discretion ................... 17

2.

The District Court Acted Within The
Outer Boundaries Of Its Discretion And
Acted Consistently Within Applicable
Legal Standards ...................................................... 18

3.

The District Court Reached Its Decision
By An Exercise Of Reason ...................................... 21

CONCLUSION.................................................................................................... 22
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ............................................................................. 23

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES

PAGE

Doubleday & Co. v. Curtis, 763 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1985) .................................... 13
In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955) ................................................................ 13
Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821 (1994) ......... 13
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994) ..................................................... 11
Muchow v. State, 142 Idaho 401, 128 P.3d 938 (2006) ..................................... 18
Pizzuto v. State, 134 Idaho 793, 10 P.3d 742 (2000) ......................................... 10
Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197, 731 P.2d 192 (1987) .......................................... 10
State v. Boss, 122 Idaho 747, 838 P.2d 876 (Ct. App. 1992) ............................. 20
State v. Breeden, 129 Idaho 813, 932 P.2d 936 (Ct. App. 1997) ..... 16, 18, 19, 20
State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 825 P.2d 1081 (1991) ......................................... 10
State v. Carter, 155 Idaho 170, 307 P.3d 187 (2013) ........................................... 8
State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 313 P.3d 1 (2013) ..................................... 11, 15
State v. Findeisen, 133 Idaho 228, 984 P.2d 716 (Ct. App. 1999) ..................... 21
State v. Gallipeau, 128 Idaho 1, 909 P.2d 619 (Ct. App. 1994) ......................... 18
State v. Gawron, 112 Idaho 841, 736 P.2d 1295 (1987) .................................... 20
State v. Harvey, 142 Idaho 727, 132 P.3d 1255 (Ct. App. 2006) ....................... 17
State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 768 P.2d 1331 (1989) ..................................... 17
State v. Josephson, 125 Idaho 119, 867 P.2d 993 (Ct. App. 1993) ................... 20
State v. Lankford, 113 Idaho 688, 747 P.2d 710 (1987) .................................... 10
State v. Lankford, 116 Idaho 860, 781 P.2d 197 (1989) .................................... 10
State v. Longest, 149 Idaho 782, 241 P.3d 955 (2010) ........................................ 8

iii

State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961 (2010) ............................................ 8
State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742, 810 P.2d 680 (1991) ....................................... 10
State v. Waterman, 36 Idaho 259, 210 P. 208 (1922) ........................................ 10
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) .................................................................. 10
United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1965) ............................................ 13
Young v. United States, 481 U.S. 787 (1987) .................................................... 13
STATUTES
I.C. § 1-1603 ........................................................................................... 11, 12, 14
I.C. § 19-2602 ............................................................................................... 12, 14
I.C. § 20-222 ..................................................................................... 12, 14, 16, 18
I.C. § 31-2603(a) ................................................................................................ 13
I.C. § 37-2732(A)(1)(A) ....................................................................................... 18
RULES
I.C.R. 42 ............................................................................................................. 14

iv

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Kody Ray Gibbs appeals from the district court’s order extending the
period of his probation. On appeal Gibbs argues the district court was biased
against him personally and abused its discretion by extending his probation.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Gibbs sold methamphetamine to an underage girl. (R., pp. 21-23.) Gibbs
was charged with and eventually pled guilty to delivery of a controlled substance,
methamphetamine. (R., pp. 44-45, 55-57.) The district court sentenced Gibbs to
15 years with 10 years fixed, but suspended execution of the sentence and
placed Gibbs on probation for five years. (R., pp. 60-62, 66-71.) Gibbs was
placed in Mental Health Court and his case was reassigned to a different district
judge. (R., pp. 73-74.)
Initially, Gibbs appeared to do well on probation and in Mental Health
Court. (See R., pp. 77-106.) However, after about 11 months on probation,
Gibbs was ordered to serve discretionary time because he “had a positive UA for
Spice.” (R., p. 107.) The district court allowed Gibbs to stay in Mental Health
Court and on probation.

(R., p. 109-112.) A month later, Gibbs was again

ordered to serve discretionary time because he had used “Spice” and alcohol,
frequented a bar, and associated with people involved in criminal activity.
(R., p. 113.) From August 14, 2014 to October 2, 2014, the progress reports
were more negative and noting that Gibbs “needs to take this program seriously”
and reported as a problem that Gibbs had “associate[ed] with a minor.”
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(R., pp. 115, 117-119, 121-123.) However, he was again allowed to remain in
Mental Health Court program and on probation. (Id.)
On November 19, 2014, Gibbs’ probation officer filed a Report of
Probation Violation alleging Gibbs had “engaged in sexual activity with a 14 year
old girl.”

(R., pp. 127-146.)

The state filed a motion to show cause why

probation should not be revoked. (R., pp. 149-170.) At the filing of the probation
violation, Gibbs was finally terminated from Mental Health Court. (R., p. 148.)
Both the new charge, CRF 2014-21326, arising from the sexual activity
with a 14-year-old, and the pending probation violation were resolved by a
written I.C.R. 11(f) Plea Agreement. (R., pp. 176-179.) The plea agreement
stated that Gibbs would plead guilty to felony injury to child in case CRF 201421326 and would serve a period of retained jurisdiction. (Id.) The present case
would be held in “abeyance” until Gibbs completed his period of retained
jurisdiction. (Id.)
During the subsequent probation violation hearing, the district court
declined to be bound by the parties’ Rule 11 agreement, but stated that it would
not do anything inconsistent with the sentence imposed in CRF 2014-21326 and
would continue Gibbs on probation. (R., p. 180.) Gibbs admitted the probation
violation.

(R., p. 180.) The district court continued Gibbs on probation, but

extended Gibbs’ probation by another year and ordered as an additional
condition of probation that Gibbs successfully complete the period of retained
jurisdiction ordered in CRF 2014-21326.
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(R., pp. 182-184.)

After Gibbs

completed his period of retained jurisdiction he continued on probation in this
case.
On February 23, 2016, Gibbs’ probation officer filed another report of
probation violation. (R., pp. 185-188.) The report alleged that Gibbs committed
the new felony crime of Sexual Exploitation of a Child, admitted to using
methamphetamine, violated the sex offender agreement by possessing three
unauthorized smart phones, had contact with his methamphetamine supplier,
and had prohibited contact with a victim. (Id.) The state filed a Motion to Show
Cause Why Probation Should Not Be Revoked. (R., pp. 205-209.)
Around this time, Gibbs also became the target of a federal grand jury
investigation for possession of child pornography. (See R., p. 227; Conf. R.,
pp. 52-64.)

At the next hearing, the parties discussed the possibility of

withdrawing the probation violation allegations because of the pending federal
matter, and the state asked for a continuance to determine the status of the
federal matter. (4/27/16 Tr., p. 8, L. 17 – p. 9, L. 8; R., p. 223.) The Court then
gave notice that it intended to enforce its orders. (4/27/16 Tr., p. 9, L. 22 – p. 10,
L. 12.)
THE COURT: Okay. Well, if the State does withdraw the
allegations, I intend to proceed on an order to show cause. I have
the ability to enforce my orders, and if these allegations are proven
to be true my intention is to impose your Idaho prison sentence, so
we can proceed at a later date but it would be on an evidentiary
hearing even if the State wants to withdraw these allegations, so
does the plaintiff have a proposal on how to proceed with an
evident -- or at what time would you want to see an evidentiary
hearing which is what I thought we were going to be here on today
with all the subpoenas that have been issued and all the people
that are here in the courtroom ---
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MS. KLEMPEL: And Your Honor –
THE COURT: -- and the time that we’d set aside for that.
(Id.) The district court was concerned that its orders were not being followed.
(4/27/16 Tr., p. 9, L. 22 – p. 13, L. 2.) The district court wanted the evidentiary
hearing to go forward, but Gibbs and the state both indicated they were not
prepared for the evidentiary hearing, so the district court granted a two-week
continuance. (Id.) The district court stated that it believed it had the power to
enforce its own orders, but invited both parties to research the issue. (4/27/16
Tr., p. 12, Ls. 4-10.)
THE COURT: Okay. Well, and I think both sides need to
research my ability to go forward. I mean I don’t want to do
something illegal, but my understanding is that the Court has the
power to enforce its own orders, and if you’re going to strip the
Court of that power, I’m not – you’d better be sure you can do it.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I completely agree the
Court has the power to enforce its orders, but I think that would be
a contempt power as opposed to the executive function of coming
in and presenting substantive evidence on the plea agreement.
(4/27/16 Tr., p. 12, Ls. 4-15.)
The parties eventually filed

a proposed plea agreement which

contemplated that the state would dismiss the motion for order to show cause in
this present case, and two other cases, and Gibbs would plead guilty in the
federal case. (R., pp. 226-228.) The agreement stated, in part:
Specifically, the parties stipulate and agree that Defendant shall
enter a guilty plea to the Indictment, or any subsequently filed
Superseding Indictment, in United States of America vs. Kody Ray
Gibbs, United States District Court for the District of Idaho, Case
No. 2:16 CR 99 BLW. In exchange for such promise to plead guilty
the prosecution herein agree to entry of an order to stay or
continue presently pending matters herein, and/or to dismiss the
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same without prejudice. Upon entry of the aforementioned plea the
prosecution herein will then move to dismiss the aforementioned
pending matters (Kootenai County Case Nos. CRF 16-3422, CRF
14-21326, and CRF 13-5235) with prejudice.
(R., p. 227.)
Counsel for Gibbs sent a letter and attachments to the district court, which
was filed with the court. (Conf. R. pp. 52-64.) The letter explained that Gibbs
was the subject of a federal grand jury investigation for possession of child
pornography, and it detailed the potential federal punishment, probation and
incarceration facing Gibbs as a result of the possession of child pornography
charge. (Id.)
At the next hearing, on May 25, 2016, the district court stated that it had
read Gibbs’ letter, but did not understand “why I would not want to enforce my
order and impose Mr. Gibbs’ prison sentence in the state of Idaho if he didn’t do
– if did what he was accused of doing, so I’ll let anybody take on that question.”
(5/25/16 Tr., p. 15, L. 12 – p. 16, L. 4.) The state indicated that it wanted to
dismiss the motion to show cause because it believed Gibbs was going to be
serving a federal prison sentence. (5/25/16 Tr., p. 18, L. 10 – p. 24, L. 17.) The
district court and the parties discussed the possibility of appointing a special
prosecutor to enforce the court’s orders and whether that special prosecutor
would be bound by the plea agreement. (5/25/16 Tr., p. 24, L. 21 – p. 26, L. 25.)
The district court granted the state’s motion to dismiss its motion to show cause.
(5/25/16 Tr., p. 27, L. 1 – p. 28, L. 13.) The district court indicated it intended to
appoint a special prosecutor and entered its own order to show cause why
Gibbs’ probation should not be revoked. (5/25/16 Tr., p. 27, L. 1 – p. 28, L. 13.)
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The district court was concerned that the judiciary’s ability to enforce its own
orders would be circumvented by the parties' agreement in this case. (Id.)
At the next hearing, the district court reconsidered its decision to appoint a
special prosecutor. (6/6/16 Tr., p. 31, L. 7 – p. 32, L. 4.) Instead of appointing a
special prosecutor, the district court recognized that it could change the terms
and conditions of Gibbs’ probation, including extending the length of probation,
without a hearing. (Id.) The district court changed the period of Gibbs’ probation
from six years to life. (Id.) Gibbs objected because he believed the increase in
length of the probation constituted an increased sentence. (6/6/16 Tr., p. 32,
Ls. 10-24.) The district court acknowledged that it did not have the power to
increase the sentence, but stated that it did have the power to increase the
length of probation. (6/6/16 Tr., p. 32, L. 25 – p. 33, L. 16.) The district court
indicated it would reconsider its decision if the parties were able to provide a
legal argument to the contrary. (Id.)
The district court explained that it was important to extend Gibbs’
probation because it would benefit the public to have Gibbs on probation in
addition to any parole he might be on after he was released from federal
custody. (Id.) The district court explained that increasing Gibbs probation would
help protect the public. (6/6/16 Tr., p. 32, L. 25 – p. 33, L. 16, p. 33, L. 25 –
p. 34, L. 3.) The district court entered a written order extending Gibbs’ probation
to life. (R., p. 230.) Gibbs filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp. 231-234.)
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ISSUES
Gibbs states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Was Mr. Gibbs denied his constitutional right to due process
because his case was not heard by an impartial judge?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it sua sponte
modified Mr. Gibbs’ probation from a term of six years to life
after the probation violation allegations in this case were
dismissed?

(Appellant’s brief, p. 6.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Gibbs failed to show that it was fundamental error for the
district court to preside over his case because the judge was not impartial?
2.
Has Gibbs failed to show the district court abused its discretion
when it extended the term of his probationary period?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Did Not Commit Fundamental Error By Remaining On This
Case And Extending Gibbs’ Probationary Period
A.

Introduction
Gibbs argues the district court violated his procedural due process right to

have an impartial judge. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-10.) Gibbs claims the
district court’s decision to remain on the case and extend his probation
amounted to fundamental error. (See id.) Gibbs’ claim that the district judge
was not impartial fails all three prongs of the fundamental error test.
B.

Standard Of Review
The fundamental error test articulated by the Idaho Supreme Court in

State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961 (2010), applies when there is a
claim of an unobjected to error at a proceeding following the guilt phase. State v.
Carter, 155 Idaho 170, 174, 307 P.3d 187, 191 (2013) (citing State v. Longest,
149 Idaho 782, 241 P.3d 955 (2010)). Under Perry it is the defendant’s burden
to demonstrate that “the alleged error: (1) violates one or more of the
defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for
any additional information not contained in the appellate record, including
information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3)
was not harmless.” Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980.
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C.

Gibbs Has Failed To Show The District Court Was Not Impartial
Gibbs argues on appeal that his due process rights were violated when

the district court extended his probation because the district court was prejudiced
against him. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-10.) Gibbs concedes he did not raise
a due process challenge before the district court; therefore he acknowledges he
must meet the fundamental error standard.

(See Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-8.)

Gibbs’ argument fails all three prongs of the fundamental error test.
1.

Gibbs Has Failed To Establish The District Court Was Not Impartial
And That The District Court Violated An Unwaived Constitutional
Right By Presiding Over His Case

On appeal Gibbs argues the district court’s involvement in his case
violated his unwaived constitutional due process right to have an impartial judge.
(See, e.g., Appellant’s brief, p. 7 (“The judge was not impartial and his
involvement in this case violated Mr. Gibbs’ right to due process.”), p. 8 (“the
judge’s bias is clear from the record”), p. 9 (“If this case had been heard by an
impartial judge, Mr. Gibbs’ probation would not have been extended.”), p. 9 (“the
judge filled the role of prosecutor himself, which is impermissible, and violated
1
Mr. Gibbs’ right to procedural due process”). ) Contrary to Gibbs’ argument on

appeal, the district court did not violate his procedural due process rights.

1

Gibbs does not argue that the extension of his probation itself violated his
procedural due process right, but that it was the alleged partiality by the district
court that violated his procedural due process rights. (See Appellant’s brief,
pp. 7-10.) This appears to be an argument that the district court should have
recused itself, though Gibbs does not use the word “recuse.” (See Appellant’s
brief, p. 14 (requesting that if the case is remanded, a different district judge
preside).)
9

A defendant has a due process right to have an impartial trial judge.
Pizzuto v. State, 134 Idaho 793, 799, 10 P.3d 742, 748 (2000) (citing State v.
Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742, 776, 810 P.2d 680, 714 (1991) (overruled on other
grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 432, 825 P.2d 1081, 1088 (1991));
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927); State v. Lankford, 116 Idaho 860, 781 P.2d
197 (1989). “In Idaho a judge cannot be disqualified for actual prejudice unless it
is shown that the prejudice is directed against the litigant and is of such a nature
and character that it would make it impossible for the litigant to get a fair trial.”
Id. (quoting Pizzuto, 119 Idaho at 776, 810 P.2d at 714; State v. Lankford,
113 Idaho 688, 700, 747 P.2d 710, 722 (1987); State v. Waterman, 36 Idaho
259, 210 P. 208 (1922)). “Whether the judge’s involvement in the defendant’s
case reaches the point where disqualification from further participation in a case
becomes necessary is left to the sound discretion of the trial judge.” Id. (quoting
Pizzuto, 119 Idaho at 776, 810 P.2d at 714; Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197,
731 P.2d 192 (1987)).

Even when a trial judge has obtained prejudicial

information regarding the defendant, the judge is “usually presumed to be
‘capable of disregarding that which should be disregarded’ in our judicial
system.”

Id.

(quoting Pizzuto, 119 Idaho at 776, 810 P.2d at 714; Sivak,

112 Idaho at 205, 731 P.2d at 200).
The Idaho Supreme Court has looked to United States Supreme Court
precedent and determined that judicial rulings alone “almost never” constitute a
valid basis to establish bias:
It is enough for present purposes to say the following: First, judicial
rulings alone almost never constitute valid basis for a bias or
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partiality motion ... and can only in the rarest circumstances
evidence the degree of favoritism or antagonism required.... Almost
invariably, they are proper grounds for appeal, not for recusal.
Second, opinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts
introduced or events occurring in the course of the current
proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a
bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep seated
favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.
Thus, judicial remarks during the course of a trial that are critical or
disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their
cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge....
State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 391, 313 P.3d 1, 47 (2013) (ellipse in original)
(quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555-556 (1994)).
Gibbs has failed to establish the district court was not impartial. Gibbs
does not point to any evidence that the district court considered improper
evidence or had any personal animosity towards him. In fact, even the evidence
cited by Gibbs shows that the district court was not motivated by any animus
towards Gibbs, but rather was concerned, generally, about a district court’s
ability to enforce its own orders. (See, e.g., 5/25/16 Tr., p. 27, Ls. 1-16 (“I’m not
going to let the judiciary’s ability to enforce its own order to be tramped, and I’m
not mad at either one of you for what you’ve done, but I think it would set a really
bad precedent for this to be able to be done without a judge’s agreement.”) The
district court was correct.
It is a basic principle that every court has the power to enforce its orders.
See I.C. § 1-1603.
Every court has power:
…
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2. To enforce order in the proceedings before it or before a person
or persons empowered to conduct a judicial investigation under its
authority.
…
4. To compel obedience to its judgments, orders and process, and
to the orders of a judge out of court in an action or proceeding
pending therein.
See I.C. § 1-1603. And, in a probation proceeding, the court has continuing
jurisdiction over probation and may extend probation at any time within the
probationary period. I.C. § 20-222. And the court itself can issue a warrant for
violation of probation. I.C. § 20-222(2); see also I.C. § 19-2602 (court can issue
bench warrant for rearrest of defendant for “any other cause satisfactory to the
court”). It was entirely appropriate for the district court to enforce its orders that
required Gibbs to abide by certain terms of probation.
The district court explained that it was extending Gibbs’ probation, not out
of some personal animosity or bias, but rather for the protection of society and
public safety. (See 6/6/16 Tr., p. 32, L. 25 – p. 33, L. 16, p. 33, L. 25 – p. 34,
L. 3.) This decision was not based on some personal animus toward Gibbs, but
rather for the legitimate interest in protecting society. (See, e.g., R., pp. 127-146,
180 (admitted probation violation due to sexual activity with 14 year old girl),
p. 227 (Gibbs informed district court he would plead guilty to possession of child
pornography).) The ultimate decision to extend Gibbs’ probation was within the
district court’s discretion.

See I.C. § 20-222(1) (“The period of probation or

suspension of sentence shall be fixed by the court and may at any time be
extended or terminated by the court.”).
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Nor does the fact the district court considered, but ultimately did not,
appoint a special prosecutor indicate any personal bias towards Gibbs. Under
certain circumstances the district court can appoint a special prosecutor. See
I.C. § 31-2603(a).2 The district court considered appointing a special prosecutor,
but ultimately decided not to. If anything, this decision not to appoint a special
prosecutor shows the district court was acting within the bounds of the law and
was not personally prejudiced against Gibbs.
Gibbs also argues on appeal that the district court was impermissibly
acting as prosecutor when it considered initiating order to show cause
proceedings against Gibbs. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-9.) None of the cases
cited by Gibbs supports a finding that the district court here exceeded its
authority when it considered appointing a special prosecutor.

See In re

Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 137 (1955) (holding violation of due process for a
“judge-grand jury”); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965)
(requiring prosecutors to sign indictments); Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of
Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 837-838 (1994) (determining whether sanction
was civil or criminal); Doubleday & Co. v. Curtis, 763 F.2d 495, 502 (2d Cir.
1985) (district court violated due process when it dismissed a civil complaint on
grounds that were never raised or argued); Young v. United States, 481 U.S.

2

It is not clear that all the necessary circumstances were present for the district
court to appoint a special prosecutor under Idaho Code § 31-2603(a). However,
that is irrelevant because the district court ultimately decided not to appoint such
a special prosecutor.
13

787, 799-800 (1987) (under federal rules, district courts can appoint private
attorneys to prosecute contempt actions).
The district court considered ordering Gibbs to show cause why his
probation should not be revoked. However, the district court ultimately decided
not to issue such an order. (See R., p. 230.) The district court only reserved the
right to bring a show cause order at a later date. (Id.) Thus the district court
never actually went through with initiating a show cause proceeding against
Gibbs.
Even if the district court had gone through with the order to show cause
proceeding such would have been an appropriate exercise of judicial power. As
noted above, the district court has the power to enforce its own orders and
specifically has powers in the context of probation. See I.C. §§ 1-1603, 19-2602,
20-222. The district court was not attempting to prosecute a crime. The district
court was not contemplating initiating a complaint or new criminal proceeding.
The district court was contemplating issuing an order to show cause why Gibbs
was not following the district court’s orders. The court had authority under I.C.
§§ 19-2602, 20-222 and continuing jurisdiction over Gibbs’ probation.
Further, in our justice system, it is not unusual for a district court to initiate
an order to show cause in other contexts.

For example, under the Idaho

Criminal Rules, the court has the power to initiate both summary and
nonsummary contempt proceedings if someone has failed to follow a court’s
order. See I.C.R. 42.
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Gibbs has failed to show the district court was biased against him. There
is no evidence of personal animosity of the district court toward Gibbs. Instead
there is ample evidence of the district court’s legitimate concern regarding
enforcing its own orders and the protection of society.
2.

Gibbs Has Failed To Establish It Was Clear Error For The District
Court To Preside Over Gibbs’ Case

It is not clear from the record that Gibbs’ right to an impartial judge was
violated.

As noted above, there is nothing in the record that indicates any

personal animosity by the district court toward Gibbs. See § I.C.1. There is
evidence in the record to the contrary. The district court judge was the same
judge who oversaw Gibbs’ progress in Mental Health Court. (See R., pp. 77106.) From August 22, 2013 until June 19, 2014 the progress reports, signed by
the district judge, stated that Gibbs was doing well in the program and on
probation. (Id.) From July 10, 2014 to August 7, 2014, the district court allowed
Gibbs to stay in Mental Health Court and on probation after positive UAs.
(R., pp. 109-112.) Instead of evidence of a prejudiced judge, the record reflects
a district judge who fairly presided over Gibbs’ case for years.
That the court exercised authority to oversee Gibbs’ probation and extend
the length of his probation after Gibbs was accused of additional crimes also fails
to show bias. See Dunlap, 155 Idaho at 391, 313 P.3d at 47 (judicial rulings
alone almost never constitute a valid basis to establish bias).
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3.

Gibbs Has Failed To Show The First Two Prongs Of The
Fundamental Error Test; Thus The Harmlessness Prong Is Moot

If the district court was prejudiced against him, then Gibbs is likely entitled
to have another district court determine whether his probation should be
extended. However, Gibbs has failed to show any clear violation of his right to
an impartial judge.

The third prong of the fundamental error test is moot

because Gibbs has failed to show either of the first two prongs of the applicable
fundamental error test.
II.
The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion
A.

Introduction
The district court has the discretionary authority to extend probation at any

time so long as the probationary period does not exceed the maximum period for
which the defendant might have been imprisoned. See I.C. § 20-222(1). Here,
the extension of probation did not exceed the maximum period for which Gibbs
might have been imprisoned. Gibbs has failed to show the district court abused
its discretion when it extended Gibbs’ probationary period.
B.

Standard Of Review
“Determining whether to extend the probationary period is a discretionary

decision for the trial court.” State v. Breeden, 129 Idaho 813, 815, 932 P.2d 936,
938 (Ct. App. 1997). “When an exercise of discretion is reviewed on appeal, the
appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry. The sequence of the inquiry is
(1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion;
(2) whether the court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and
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consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices; and
(3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.” State v.
Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989) (citation omitted).
C.

Gibbs Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion When
It Extended His Probation
1.

The District Court Rightly Perceived The Issue Of Whether To
Extend Gibbs’ Probation As One Of Discretion

In deciding to extend Gibbs’ probation, the district court rightly perceived
the issue as one of discretion.

After considering various other options, the

district court correctly stated that it had the ability to extend probation at any
time. (6/6/16 Tr., p. 31, L. 7 – p. 32, L. 4.)
Since that time it occurred to me that there’s perhaps a simpler
solution from the Court’s standpoint anyway, and that is that the
Court has the ability at any point in time with or without a hearing to
change terms and conditions of probation, add a length to the term
of probation, and it would be the Court’s intent right now to
increase the length of probation probably indefinitely which can be
done under – the nature of the crime was delivery of a controlled
substance, carries with it potentially a life sentence, so the
defendant could be on probation for life, so any – anything that the
State could like to put on the record? I guess I’m giving notice
that’s what I’m going to do.
(6/6/16 Tr., p. 31, L. 16 – p. 32, L. 4.)3

The district court recognized that it did

not have the power to increase the sentence, but correctly noted that it did have

3

On appeal, Gibbs does not argue that this notice and subsequent opportunity to
argue was inadequate for procedural due process. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 714.) Even if it was raised on appeal, it is not clear whether the procedural
safeguards applicable to probation revocation apply equally to the extension of
probation. See State v. Harvey, 142 Idaho 727, 732, 132 P.3d 1255, 1260
(Ct. App. 2006).
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the power to increase the length of probation. (6/6/16 Tr., p. 32, L. 25 – p. 33,
L. 16.) The district court recognized the issue as one of discretion.
2.

The District Court Acted Within The Outer Boundaries Of Its
Discretion And Acted Consistently Within Applicable Legal
Standards

“[A] court may at any time extend a period of probation so long as the
probationary period does not exceed the maximum period for which the
defendant might have been imprisoned.” State v. Gallipeau, 128 Idaho 1, 5,
909 P.2d 619, 623 (Ct. App. 1994) (citing I.C. § 20-222). Idaho Code § 20222(1) states:
(1) The period of probation or suspension of sentence shall be
fixed by the court and may at any time be extended or terminated
by the court. Such period with any extension thereof shall not
exceed the maximum period for which the defendant might have
been imprisoned.
I.C. § 20-222(1); see also Breeden, 129 Idaho at 815, 932 P.2d at 938.
Gibbs was convicted of delivery of a controlled substance under Idaho
Code § 37-2732(A)(1)(A). (R., p. 66-71.) Under Idaho Code § 37-2732(A)(1)(A)
the maximum period for which Gibbs might have been imprisoned is life. See
Muchow v. State, 142 Idaho 401, 403, 128 P.3d 938, 940 (2006) (defining
“maximum period for which the defendant might have been imprisoned” as “the
total number of days a defendant may be placed in physical custody for a
particular crime”). Extending Gibbs’ probation to lifetime probation was within
the outer boundaries of the district court’s discretion and was consistent with
applicable law.
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On appeal, Gibbs argues the district court did not act within the outer
boundaries of its discretion or with applicable standards because, he contends,
the district court acted out of “animus” and the extension “was not reasonably
related to the goal fostering Mr. Gibbs’ rehabilitation and protecting public
safety.” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 11-12.) Gibbs’ arguments are without merit. As
noted above, there is no evidence in the record that the district court acted with
personal “animus” toward Gibbs. See §§ I.C.1-2.
Next, the district court considered Gibbs’ potential federal sentence and
determined that it would further the goal of protection of society to extend Gibbs’
probation. (6/6/16 Tr., p. 32, L. 25 – p. 33, L. 16.) The district court explained
that it would benefit the public to have Gibbs on state probation in addition to
parole from the federal system. (Id.)
THE COURT: That seemed to be a lot of work and – and I think
this is a better result for the public. I think I can protect the public
better this way than what I was proposing doing earlier.
(6/6/16 Tr., p. 33, L. 25 – p. 34, L. 3.)

Considering the crimes that Gibbs

admitted to committing, the district court’s decision was reasonable. (See, e.g.,
R., pp. 21-23, 55-57 (pled guilty to delivery of a controlled substance,
methamphetamine, that arose from selling methamphetamine to an underage
girl), 127-146, 180 (admitted probation violation due to sexual activity with 14year-old girl), p. 227 (Gibbs informed district court he would plead guilty to
possession of child pornography).).
In Breeden, supra, the district court extended Breeden’s probation without
a probation violation hearing because extending probation would help protect
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public safety. 129 Idaho at 814-815, 932 P.2d at 937-938. Near the conclusion
of his seven-year probationary period, the state filed a motion to double
Breeden’s probationary period so he could finish paying off restitution. Id. The
district court granted the motion. Id. The Court of Appeals found that it was not
an abuse of the district court’s discretion to extend the length of Breeden’s
probationary period. Id.
Breeden argued that the extension of probation was an abuse of
discretion because the extension of probation was for the sole purpose of
providing a convenient collection mechanism for restitution and did not serve a
rehabilitative purpose. Breeden, 129 Idaho at 815-816, 932 P.2d at 938-939.
The Idaho Court of Appeals disagreed. Id. The Court explained that “[t]he goal
of probation is to foster the defendant’s rehabilitation while protecting public
safety.” Id. at 816, 932 P.2d at 939 (citing State v. Gawron, 112 Idaho 841, 843,
736 P.2d 1295, 1297 (1987); State v. Josephson, 125 Idaho 119, 123, 867 P.2d
993, 997 (Ct. App. 1993); State v. Boss, 122 Idaho 747, 748, 838 P.2d 876, 877
(Ct. App. 1992)).

The Court found that requiring Breeden to pay restitution

promoted “public safety be exacting a ‘price’ for the crime, which may deter the
defendant and other from such offenses.” Id. (citation omitted). Here, the district
court also found that extending Gibbs’ period of probation would serve a public
safety goal.
Gibbs also argues that the district court did not act within applicable legal
standards because it could not modify Gibbs’ probation based on conduct that
was not before the court. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 12 -13.) In support of this
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argument Gibbs cites to State v. Findeisen, 133 Idaho 228, 984 P.2d 716
(Ct. App. 1999). (See id.) Findeisen is inapplicable. Findeisen was sentenced
by one district judge for kidnapping, intimidating a witness and aggravated
battery. Findeisen, 133 Idaho at 228-228, 984 P.2d at 716-717. Later the same
day Findeisen was sentenced by a second district judge for a burglary charge.
Id. During the second sentencing the second district judge and the prosecutor
almost exclusively focused their comments on the facts relating to the
kidnapping, intimidating a witness and aggravated battery charges. Id. at 229230, 984 P.2d at 717-18. The Court of Appeals found that the second district
court abused its discretion. Id. Here, unlike Findeisen, the district court was not
entering a sentence for a particular crime. The district court was considering
whether to extend Gibbs’ probation. The district court considered Gibbs’ conduct
while he was on probation in the present case, which included committing new
crimes, including possession of child pornography and sexual activity with a 14year-old girl.

It is appropriate for a district court to consider a probationer’s

conduct while he or she is on probation when determining whether to extend or
reduce the probationary period.

Findeisen is inapplicable. The district court

acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and within applicable legal
standards.
3.

The District Court Reached Its Decision By An Exercise Of Reason

The district court reached its decision to extend Gibbs’ probation by the
exercise of reason.

As noted above, the district court first examined other

methods to enforce its orders and to protect society and solicited advice from the
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parties. (See 4/27/16 Tr., p. 12, Ls. 4-10; 5/25/16 Tr., p. 27, L. 1 – p. 28, L. 13.)
After consideration, the district court declined to appoint a special prosecutor, but
instead decided to extend Gibbs’ probation. (6/6/16 Tr., p. 31, L. 7 – p. 33,
L. 16.) The district court then said it would reconsider its decision if the parties
provided him with a legal argument to the contrary.

(Id.) The district court

determined that extending Gibbs’ probation so he would still be on state
probation while he was on any potential federal parole would serve public safety.
Gibbs has failed to show the district court did not exercise reason.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the order of the district
court.
DATED this 8th day of March, 2017.
_/s/ Ted S. Tollefson______
TED S. TOLLEFSON
Deputy Attorney General
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